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LIMITATIONS ON FAMILY SIZE: POTENTIAL PRESSURES ON THE
RIGHTS OF PRIVACY AND PROCREATION*

By Rodney A. Smolla**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

HEIDEN v. WEBSTER
(Argued November 15, 2022; Decided May 20, 2023)
541 U.S. 919, 23 L.Ed. 3d 766, 143 S.Ct. 880 (2023)

CHIEF JUSTICE CALVIN delivered an opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of the Quality of Life Act
of 2020.' In response to intense pressures placed upon the quality of life and economy
of the United States, including a growing environmental crisis, an escalating trade
imbalance, and a dramatic population explosion, the United States Congress in 2020
enacted sweeping limitations on the size of American families. The Quality of Life Act,
with certain exceptions, limits the size of American families to two children. The
petitioners have asked this Court to strike down that limitation on the ground that it
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Events Leading to the Passageof the Act
The Quality of Life Act of 2020 on review before this Court is one of a series
of congressional enactments passed in response to an increasing sense of national crisis
caused by the economic and environmental catastrophes which have beset this nation since
the turn of the century.2

In this fictional Supreme Court opinion, set in the year 2023, Rodney A. Smolla explores the future
of the rights to privacy and procreation, against the backdrop of 21st Century pressures on the environment
and economy.
Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, and the Director of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law, at the
College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
1 108 U.S.C. §§ 2084-2091 (2020).
2 See, e.g., The Outer Space Citizenship Allegiance Act of 2017, 108 U.S.C. § 2001 (2017).
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Constitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum of intellectual abstraction, but
in the flesh-and-blood world of war, hunger, confrontation, and conflict. A Constitution
is of little value if there is no nation in existence to preserve, protect, and defend it.
Constitutional liberties, and the reasonable restraints that must always, of necessity, be
placed upon those liberties if the nation is to survive, cannot be intelligently discussed
except against the backdrop of living history. We thus do not evaluate the constitutionality
of the Quality of Life Act in the pristine, antiseptic, intellectual world of law professors
sitting in their offices while pondering legal theory, but rather in the pragmatic world of
jurists deciding practical matters of law as working magistrates of government. We
evaluate this Act of Congress, in short, against the historical realities that formed its
genesis. The constitutionality of the Quality of Life Act must, therefore, be analyzed in
light of the cataclysmic events precipitating its passage.3
At the Treaty of Athens, signed in 2018, the United States was forced to make
concessions to the world's developing nations, to Japan, and to the European Confederation that would have been beyond contemplation in the twentieth century.4 These
concessions included an "open border" policy, in which the United States agreed to exert
no controls over the free flow of goods, currency, and people across its frontiers for a
period of ten years. This meant that the United States could not prevent migration into the
nation from other countries, nor could it enact trade or monetary policies designed to
favor American interests at the expense of other nations.5
Congress in the year 2020 was looking at frightening changes in life in the
United States and, indeed, the world. The nation had been aware of dangers to the
environment as far back as the 1970s, when the first significant American environmental
laws were passed. But for the most part, the United States and other nations on the globe
were content to slide by with half-measures concerning environmental protection. While
an oil spill, a nuclear power plant accident, or the death of a lake or a forest from acid
rain would occasionally capture the public imagination, for the most part political forces
were never sufficiently galvanized by the gradual, incremental corrosion of the ecosystem
to generate decisive action. By 2020, however, the basic life-support systems of
"spaceship earth" were beginning to deteriorate to the point that replenishment and
regeneration were in serious doubt. The United States suffered acutely from these global
trends. American agriculture was particularly hard hit by environmental changes, finding
itself in a state of profound distress. Once the breadbasket of the nation, the American
Midwest was turned into a dustbowl wasteland, and for the first time in its history the
United States became a net importer of food.
Despite these setbacks, the open door policy mandated by the Treaty of Athens
generated a huge influx of immigration from the beleaguered peoples of the world,
arriving in teeming masses from South America, Africa, and Asia, as the tired, oppressed,
poor, and hungry sought the refuge they had so often found on America's sweet shores.
For notwithstanding its recent military and economic embarrassments, the United States
still enjoyed a standard of living far above that of most nations of the world. And the
openness of its culture, its tradition of respect for elemental civil rights and civil liberties,
its commitment to ethnic, racial, and religious tolerance, its centuries of orderly legal

3 This Court has previously expounded on the significance of these events. See generally Dodson v.
United States, 538 U.S. 202 (2020) (rejecting challenges to the Outer Space Citizenship Allegiance Act of
2017).
4 See generally Linda Malone, The Treaty of Athens: An Historicaland JurisprudentialAnalysis,
129

HARV. L. REV. 1 (2019).
5 These open market and open migration policies were similarly applied to all other signatories to the
Treaty.
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stability, its well-established system of free public education, and perhaps above all else,
the optimistic sense of hope and opportunity that has always characterized the special
promise of American life, combined to make America still among the most appealing
places to live in the world.
These events, however, made it increasingly obvious to Congress that the quality
of life in the United States would be irreversibly damaged if certain immediate steps were
not taken to rejuvenate the economy and to restore stability and recovery to the
environment. Among the measures required, Congress determined, was population control.
The Treaty of Athens foreclosed the obvious step of stemming the tide of immigration.
The precarious international position of the United States convinced the President and
Congress that repudiation of the obligations of the Treaty of Athens would be reckless
foreign policy. The economic leverage exerted by Japan and the European Confederation,
as well as the jittery military instability caused by the proliferation of nuclear arms,
convinced the executive and legislative branches that population control measures, at least
for the ten-year moratorium on immigration controls set by the Treaty of Athens, would
have to be internal.6
Changes in medical technology also influenced passage of the Quality of Life
Act. In 2010, a series of breathtaking advances in the science of immunology led to the
virtual elimination of all sexually-transmitted diseases in the United States. AIDS, syphilis,
gonorrhea, herpes, and other diseases associated with sexual contact were wiped out as
health threats. The amelioration of death and human suffering caused by these diseases
marked one of the great victories in the history of science. Yet the silver lining had its
cloud; one of the few remaining deterrents to sexual permissiveness in society had been
eliminated.
The increased sexual freedom brought on by the elimination of serious health
threats from sexual activity was further encouraged by changes in birth control
technology. With the advent in 2012 of the so-called "on-off' birth control pill,
contraception became easier than ever. For years, the "morning after" pill had been freely
marketed throughout the United States. A woman taking this pill within forty-eight hours
after intercourse was assured that no pregnancy would ensue. Because the "morning after"
pill terminated incipient pregnancies after the sperm cell had fertilized the egg cell, some
objected to the pill on religious grounds, claiming that to end the days-old pregnancy after
conception was a form of abortion as morally repugnant as abortions at more developed
stages of fetal life. Exercising the freedom granted to the states to regulate abortion that

6

See generally JOINT CONF. REP. ON S. 1209, available in 209 CONG. REC. DATABASE, File No. 39-A

(2020). All parties stipulate that the Joint Conference Report is the most informative and authoritative
source for the legislative history of the Act. The congressional purposes underlying the Act, and the
meaning of its applicable provisions, are not disputed in this litigation.
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came with this Court's holding in Dixon v. Delaware,7 overruling the ill-fated decision
in Roe v. Wade,8 the "morning after" pill was illegal in many states.
The "on-off' pills eliminated that.legal and moral quandary, by interdicting the
sperm cells prior to fertilization and preventing conception entirely. A woman taking a red
"off' pill is immunized from pregnancy indefinitely - one pill, indeed, could last a
lifetime, though most physicians recommend a "booster" once every ten years. The "off'
pill had no known negative side effects. At any time, however, a woman could mute the
operation of the "off' pill by taking a green "on" pill. The "on" pill reversed the operation
of the "off' pill, permitting a woman to become pregnant according to her normal fertility
periods within her regular menstrual cycle. At any point, a woman could go back to a
status of infertility by simply taking another "off' pill. "On-off' pills are widely and
cheaply available throughout the United States without a prescription, and have made birth
control exceptionally easy. The pills have no medical side effects of any kind. The
legislative history of the Quality of Life Act reveals that many members of Congress were
heavily influenced in favor of voting for the bill by the fact that the birth control practices
required to comply with the law were not burdensome.9
B. The Provisions of the Act
The Quality of Life Act of 2020 is grounded in a concept of zero-population
growth, beyond whatever population increases result from international migration.'0 The
Act forbids the bearing of children outside wedlock. Married couples are permitted to bear
only two children. Adopted children do not count against the limit. If a child dies before
reaching the age of majority, the couple is permitted to bear a new child. Elaborate
regulations govern most of the unusual situations that may arise under the Act."
The principal exception to the driving zero-population growth philosophy of the
Act lies in the case of divorce and remarriage. Congress determined that every marriage
should carry with it at least the potential for bearing a child, if the couple so desires. In
cases of divorce and remarriage, spouses who enter the new marriage with the custody
of children are permitted to combine their families without violating the Act, which
normally results in a family size of no more than four children. Couples who enter a

7 525 U.S. 212 (2005).

In Dixon this Court finally repudiated, in its entirety, Roe v. Wade. See id.
This Court first began its retreat from Roe in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
During the 1990s, this Court continued to undermine Roe, but never explicitly rejected the notion that
women enjoy a constitutional right of privacy that includes decisions concerning procreation. See, e.g., Doe
v. Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 572 (1996); Duke v. Louisiana, 503 U.S. 1760 (1995). In the years since
Webster, Justice Scalia's prediction appears to have come true: "The mansion of constitutionalized abortionlaw, constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade, must be disassembled door-jamb by door-jamb, and never
entirely brought down, no matter how wrong it may be." Webster v. Center for Reproductive Services, 492
U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). The unseemliness of our waffling on the abortion question
drew criticism even from those who supported the notion of the constitutional right recognized in Roe. See
Lisa Entress and Matthew Pullen, The Curious Fate of Roe v. Wade, or How to Overrule a Case Without
Really Trying, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 35, 37 (2000) ("Whatever one's views on the merits of the
abortion question, the Court has done the nation a disservice by temporizing.").
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9 See generally JOINT CONF. REP. ON S. 1209, available in 209 CONG. REC. DATABASE, File No. 97-F
(2020).
10 108 U.S.C. § 2084(1)(a) (2020).
It The Act directs the Secretary of the Environment to promulgate regulations to enforce its
provisions. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary generally enforce the zero-population growth
concept strictly, with narrow exceptions for such eventualities as twins and other multiple-births. See 509
C.F.R. §§ 7630-7641 (2021).
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marriage with one or more prior children within the primary custody of one or both
spouses are permitted to bear one additional child. This additional child is permitted even
if it would otherwise place the remarried couple above the two-child limit. Once again,
special regulations are in place to govern situations such as joint custody upon divorce.
A divorced person who does not have children from the prior marriage, or who did not
obtain custody of the children from that marriage, is not barred from having children up
to the two-child limit in a subsequent marriage. 2
Violation of any provision of the Act is a felony, punishable by up to one year
of imprisonment and a $50,000 fine. Both parents are made criminally responsible for the
violation. "3
C. The Litigants
Three distinct sets of petitioners have filed lawsuits attacking the constitutionality
of the Quality of Life Act. The first petitioner is Mary Heiden, a thirty-two-year-old,
unmarried, single woman. Ms. Heiden wishes to bear one or more children outside
marriage. She testified at trial that she does not believe in marriage and has no desire to
be married. She is a successful surgeon, well able, financially, to support children. She
testified that it is her wish to attempt to become pregnant within the next year. When
asked on cross-examination how she intended to become pregnant, she answered that she
would either use the resources of a sperm bank or a male sexual partner, and that she
considered that choice "her private business." Ms. Heiden claims that the prohibition on
the bearing of children outside wedlock denies her "the equal protection of the laws"
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment and violates her Fifth Amendment right not
to be deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
The second petitioners are Jonathan and Alice Goodale, a married couple with
two children. They testified at trial that they wish to have an indeterminate number of
additional children. Jonathan and Alice "love children, and love family life, and have
always planned on having a big family." They were "shocked" by the passage of the
Quality of Life Act, and they have sued to enforce what they consider to be "their
constitutional right to have as many children as they please." The Goodales claim that this
right is guaranteed them as part of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the taking
of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Catherine and Ronald O'Meara are the third petitioners. The O'Mearas are
married, have two children, and profess to be devout Roman Catholics. The O'Mearas
testified at trial that their religious beliefs do not permit them to utilize any form of
contraceptive medication or device as a form of birth control. They believe, as a matter
of religious doctrine, that sexual intercourse, even for a married couple, should not be
engaged in purely for physical gratification or as an act of personal love, and that to
engage in sexual intercourse with the use of contraceptives to preclude any possibility of
procreation is sinful and unnatural. They also believe that it is God's will that they "be
fruitful and multiply." Compliance with the federal law would require the O'Mearas to
choose between total abstinence during periods in which Mrs. O'Meara is potentially
fertile, and the use of contraceptives in violation of their religious beliefs. The O'Mearas
argue that, at least as applied to them, the Quality of Life Act violates their right to the
free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.
In the brief filed on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General concedes
that all of the factual assertions made by the petitioners are truthful, and that all of the
12 108 U.S.C. § 2086(3) (2020).
13 108 U.S.C.

§ 2088 (2020).
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petitioners are completely sincere in their beliefs and convictions. The United States,
nevertheless, maintains that the Quality of Life Act is constitutional, and that the beliefs
and desires of the petitioners must, for the greater good of society, yield to the law.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. The Due Process Claims
1. The Activist Epoch
Eighteen years ago, this Court in Dixon v. Delaware,4 overturned forty years
of precedent and held that the Bill of Rights does not embody any rights of privacy,
intimacy, procreation, or sexual freedom. 5 The federal and state legislatures, we held,
are free to legislate in matters relating to marriage, sexual practices, contraception, and
procreation without fear of having such legislation struck down by this Court, provided
that the law meets minimal standards of rationality. The Dixon decision marked the end
of an epoch of judicial activism in which this Court labeled matters relating to procreation
and contraception as so-called "fundamental rights," and then forced legislative enactments6
involving those fundamental rights to meet highly rigorous standards of judicial review.'
Laws relating to procreation and contraception were routinely invalidated by this Court
under this approach.
This activist epoch began in 1965,' during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, and was a period of relatively unchecked judicial exuberance for the practice of
finding "rights" in the Constitution not explicitly articulated in the document. 7 In thai
5
year this Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut,"
a case involving a Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception."' 9 Justice William 0. Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court,
claimed that "[w]e do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions."20
The Connecticut law, Justice Douglas nevertheless held, was different, for it "operates

14 525 U.S. 212.

15 See supra note 7.
16 This was usually accomplished by employing so-called "strict scrutiny," in which the law would be
upheld only if it was passed to further a "compelling" governmental interest, and was "narrowly tailored" to
effectuate that interest. Among the forces that led this Court to abandon much of its 'fundamental rights"
jurisprudence was the widely-shared perception that various tiers of judicial review were largely contrived
and arbitrarily applied. For an excellent review of the persistence of these themes in the opinions of various
members of the Court prior to the Dixon decision, see William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
FundamentalRights Concept in American ConstitutionalLaw: A CriticalGuide to Dixon v. Delaware, 2010
DUKE L.J. 1 (2010).
17 Nothing is wrong, of course, with "judicial activism" in the sense of vigilant protection of rights
that are explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, particularly when the intent of the framers concerning the
contours of those rights is clear. I have frequently been called an "activist" in my interpretation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment - a characterization that I quite proudly accept. See Jan Laitos,
Taking Takings Seriously: In Praise of the Takings Clause Jurisprudenceof Chief Justice Staunton Calvin,
97 MICH. L. REV. 349 (2009); David Barnes, Our Calvinistic Takings Clause: A Reply to Jan Laitos, 98
MICH. L. REV. 49 (2010).
18 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19 CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (1958 rev.).

20 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
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directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one
aspect of that relation."'"
No one will argue, of course, that the sexual practices and procreative decisions
of a man and woman within the institution of marriage are not "intimate." But is that
intimacy protected anywhere in the Constitution? Justice Douglas argued in Griswold that
it is, introducing the "penumbra" theory into twentieth-century constitutional law.22
Justice Douglas maintained that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have "emanations" that radiate "zones of privacy."23 These include the rights of freedom of speech
and press, which Justice Douglas construed as including "not only the right to utter or to
print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach - indeed the freedom of the entire
university community." 24 The First Amendment, he maintained, further protects the
peripheral right of "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."2 Justice
Douglas also listed the Third Amendment's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
"in any house" in peacetime, 26 the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure, 27 and the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination as
driven by more global concerns for privacy, and as generating penumbral rights that serve
as buffers to make the specifically enumerated rights more secure.28
The "right of procreation," Justice Douglas wrote, is located in those penumbral
zones. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,"
Justice Douglas asked, "for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. 2 9
Other members of the Court in Griswold, perhaps nervous over the wispy,
ethereal nature of Justice Douglas' analysis, authored concurring opinions searching for
alternative grounds upon which to strike down the Connecticut law. Justice Arthur
Goldberg, with whom Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan concurred,
argued that the fundamental right to procreative privacy was located in the open-ended
language of the Ninth Amendment: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."30 Justice John
Marshall Harlan refused to follow either the penumbral or Ninth Amendment approaches. 3' He instead held against the constitutionality of the Connecticut law on the basis that
interference with the prerogatives of married couples concerning the birth of children
violated "the concept of ordered liberty, 32 implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Harlan "ordered liberty" concept seemed the least expansive

21

Id.

22

Id. at 482-86.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 482 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369 (1964); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.

109, 112 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 195 (1952); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).25 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
26

Id. at 484.

27

Id. (describing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "as protection against all governmental invasions

'of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886))).
28 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
29
30

Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX.).

31 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 The phrase "ordered liberty" originated in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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of the various formulations in Griswold; it was based on history, recognizing only those
liberties of ancient vintage, about which there was overwhelming societal consensus.
Justice Harlan took pains not to recognize a general right of "sexual freedom," but a much
more narrow and traditional right of privacy within the confines of conventional marriage.
Harlan thus emphasized that his ruling would not justify adultery or fornication, on the
theory that there was some broad constitutional right to engage in consensual sex.33
Not every member of the Supreme Court in Griswold was persuaded by these
opinions. Justice Potter Stewart pithily observed that Connecticut's contraception
legislation "is an uncommonly silly law. 34 Indeed, Justice Stewart opined that "[a]s a
philosophical matter, I believe the use of contraceptives in the relationship of marriage
should be left to personal and private choice, based upon each individual's moral, ethical,
and religious beliefs."35 He further observed that as "a matter of social policy, I think
professional counsel about methods of birth control should be available to all, so that each
individual's choice can be meaningfully made."36 But Stewart admonished that "we are
not asked in this case to say whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine."37
Rather, Stewart pointedly observed, "We are asked to hold that it violates the United
3
States Constitution. And that I cannot do. '
Justice Hugo Black grounded his indictment against the ruling in Griswold in the
broader march of intellectual history. 39 All of the formulas espoused by his judicial
colleagues, he maintained, amounted to nothing more than elegant elaborations on "natural
law" philosophy. n Black wrote that "[ilf these formulas based on 'natural justice,' or
others which mean the same thing, are to prevail, they require judges to determine what
is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or
unnecessary."" This, Justice Black argued, is nothing short of judicial legislation, the
exercise of the power to "make law," a power specifically denied the judicial branch under
the Constitution.42
In a ringing protest against the jurisprudence that the "modem" Supreme Court
was about to embrace, Justice Black spoke elegantly against the notion that Supreme
Court Justices should attempt to keep the Constitution "in tune with the times":

33 Justice Harlan had previously expounded on this notion of ordered liberty in a prior
opinion

involving Connecticut's regulation of contraceptives. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). One of the principal distinctions between Justice Harlan's method of analysis and
the approach of Justice Douglas was Harlan's refusal to cabin his analysis to specific clauses in the Bill of
Rights, or even their broader emanations. Harlan instead articulated a theory of judicial review predicated
largely on tradition, resting on the general notion of "liberty" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
According to Justice Harlan, "This 'liberty'
is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of [the]
freedom of speech, press, and religion; [the] freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on."
Id. at 543. Rather, maintained Harlan, the liberty "is a rational continuum, which, broadly speaking, includes
a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints [and] which also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment." Id. (citations omitted). See also Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
34 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
35 Id.
36

Id.

37 Id.
38

Id.

39 Id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
40

Id. at 521-23.

41

Id. at 511-12 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 513.

42
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I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and
written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court
to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. This idea is that the
Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court is
charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all
deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the
need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the
people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their
selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our
Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is good
enough for me. And so, I cannot rely on the Due Process Clause or the
Ninth Amendment or any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept
as a reason for striking down this state law.43
Justices Stewart and Black lost the battle in Griswold, but they would eventually
come to win the war. The victory, however, took time. The Court in 1972 held in
Eisenstadt v. Baird" that a Massachusetts law making it a felony to distribute
contraceptives except by prescription to married persons was void. In extending the
Griswold decision's recognition of the constitutional right to contraceptives to unmarried
persons, Justice Brennan wrote that "the marital couple is not an independent entity with
a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional make-up."45 According to Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt, "If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."46
The Court's most controversial extension of the constitutional right of privacy,
however, came in its infamous 1972 decision in Roe v. Wade,47 in which it held that the
privacy right emanating from the Griswold line of cases was broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Roe upheld, on privacy
grounds, a woman's "freedom of choice" to obtain an abortion in the first two trimesters
of pregnancy, prior to the viability of the fetus.
2. The Beginning of the Counter-Revolution
The first signs that the right of privacy recognized in Griswold might have been
unraveling came in this Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.4 8 The case posed
the question of whether the Constitution embodies a fundamental right of privacy over
sexual matters between consenting adults sweeping enough to guarantee a gay couple the
right to engage in acts of sodomy. Writing for the Court, Justice Byron White held that
no such fundamental right existed. Bowers did not overrule Griswold, Eisenstadt, or Roe.
It did, however, seem to hint that those cases were decisions in search of a theory. Justice
White spoke openly of the Court's "striving to assure itself and the public that announcing
rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than the

43

Id. at 522.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 453.
46 Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II, 25 (1905)).
47 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
48 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44

45
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imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government.' 49 Echoing the cautious approach of Justice Harlan, who had refused to embark
down the road of recognizing a general right of sexual privacy in the Constitut on, Justice
White in Bowers held that nothing in the Supreme Court's prior decisions "would extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy."5 ° Noting that
laws against homosexual sodomy have "ancient roots," Justice White stated that any claim
that a right to engage in such activity is deeply rooted in the Nation's history, or embedded in the concept of ordered liberty, "is, at best, facetious." 5' Justice White then offered a circumspect view of the nature of judicial review and constitutional interpretation:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to
discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.
This Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.... There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of
those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes
to itself further authority to govern the country without express
52
constitutional authority.
For nearly twenty years following Bowers, this Court struggled through a series
of inconsistent rulings, upholding claims to privacy on matters related to sex in some
cases, and denying them in others. The one consistent thread in the opinions was a bias
against all claims of privacy to engage in sexual acts outside heterosexual family
relationships. An uneasy Court tended to limit the reach of the prior cases to the
"wholesome" areas of family and marital life. One by one, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe
were overruled or severely limited.
3. The End of Activism
By the year 2005, the brazen hypocrisy of the Court's privacy jurisprudence
could not be ignored. Cures and immunizations for AIDS and other sexually-transmitted
diseases eliminated gay sex as an easy public health scapegoat for what, all along, had
clearly been "morals legislation" reflecting an historical cultural aversion to homosexuality. This Court, like society at large, had simply been discriminating between "good sex"
and "bad sex," treating one as a fundamental right, the other not. In Dixon v. Delaware,53
the Court ended this duplicity. The Constitution either included a right of privacy for
adults over intimate sexual matters or it did not. If it did, then it must be broad enough
to include all consensual adult practices, heterosexual or homosexual, and all decisions
relating to contraception or procreation, whether or not the individuals were married or
unmarried.
In Dixon this Court repudiated the entire line of cases emanating from Griswold,
at long last adopting the positions in Griswold taken by Justices Stewart and Black. Today
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we reaffirm Dixon, and uphold the Quality of Life Act. Whether we would have enacted
a two-child limit, whether we think the law wise or unwise, silly or even asinine, is
irrelevant. We simply cannot strike down a law for violating a constitutional provision that
does not exist.
There is no such thing as natural law. There may or may not be natural justice,
just like there may or may not be a God. Those basic questions of existence are beyond
the ken of the secular state and its courts. We are empowered to enforce only human law,
law we can see, feel, and touch, law promulgated by human beings for the governance
of other human beings. The Constitution is one such law, enacted by real people, in
language with real meaning. The framers were not mythical figureslike gods from Mount
Olympus. They were lawmakers. When a law passed by the framers collides with a law
passed by a subsequent federal Congress or state legislature, it goes without saying that
the Constitution controls, and we must strike the statute down. But when the Constitution
is silent, those' subsequent legislatures may do what they please.
No fundamental right to privacy exists under the Constitution, we held in Dixon,
outside the specific rights actually listed in the constitutional text. The words "sex,"
"intimacy," "procreation," "contraception," "abortion," and "privacy" do not appear in the
document. We resolutely reaffirm that ruling today. There is a right to bear arms, but no
right to bear children.
B. The Free Exercise of Religion Claims
The Petitioners Catherine and Ronald O'Meara assert that whatever our analysis
under the Due Process Clause, the Quality of Life Act violates the First Amendment's
guarantee of the free exercise of religion because it places an intolerable burden on their
Roman Catholic beliefs concerning contraception. We reject the O'Mearas' claim.
Nothing in the Quality of Life Act regulates religious belief. The Act takes no
position on when life begins, on whether contraception is consistent with God's
commands, or on whether God even exists. It does not require the O'Mearas, or anyone
else, to act in a manner contrary to their religion, or even to act at all. The O'Mearas are
not ordered by the law to use contraceptives.
Rather, the Quality of, Life Act merely does what all secular laws do: regulate
conduct and create sanctions for violation of that regulation. Indeed, the very first free
exercise of religion case ever decided by the Court, the 1879 decision in Reynolds v.
United States,54 upheld an act of Congress forbidding polygamy in the face of a claim
by a Mormon that it was his religious duty to practice it. This -Court established the
dichotomy between the regulation of religious opinion and the regulation of religious
conduct that still governs the area: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties
or subversive of good order."55
Our holding in Reynolds effectively disposes of the religious free exercise claims
in this case. If the government may place limits on the number of wives, it may place
limits on the number of children.
Realistically, of course, it is true that compliance with the Quality of Life Act
will work an especially acute hardship on the O'Mearas. Once the two-child limit is
reached, most American maried couples will be forced to forego children, but not sex.

54 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
55 Id. at 164.
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That hardship, however, is not the result of the law, but of the O'Mearas' religious
convictions, and they must have the courage of those convictions.
The O'Mearas rely on a series of decisions decided by this Court in which the
Free Exercise Clause was held to require government to make special exceptions to
otherwise valid secular regulations in order to accommodate the religious beliefs of
individuals indirectly burdened by those regulations. In Sherbert v. Verner,56 for example,
we held that South Carolina could not deny unemployment compensation to a SeventhDay Adventist who had been discharged by her employer because she would not work on
Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. It violated the Constitution, we held, to condition
the, availability of benefits on the willingness of an individual to disregard cardinal
principles of religious faith because this "effectively penalizes the free exercise" of constitutional liberties.57 Sherbert was followed by a series of decisions that forced government
to accommodate laws of general applicability to the special religious needs of individuals,
creating what was, in effect, a First Amendment "conscientious objector" doctrine. 8
In 1990, this Court first began to express doubt about the soundness of Sherbert
v. Verner and its progeny. In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,59 the Court was presented with the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause
permitted the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach
of its general criminal prohibition on the use of that drug. We held that the First
Amendment did not require Oregon to make a "sacramental use" exception to its drug
laws. Native Americans who used peyote as part of their religious rituals could thus be
sent to jail for that usage, as long as the law was one of general applicability not passed
for the purpose of penalizing religious belief. As Justice Scalia cogently observed:
[T]he "exercise of religion" often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts:
assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods
or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we think (though
no case of ours has involved the point), that a state would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only
because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be
unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of "statutes that are to
be used for worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down before a
golden calf.
• . . We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct
that the State is free to regulate.6"
We choose today to disown Sherbert v. Verner and other similar cases because
we are convinced that they are based on an analytically flawed premise. When the
government passes a law that has nothing whatsoever to do with religious beliefs, but

56 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
57 Id. at 406.
58 See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
59 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
60 Id. at 877-79.
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happens, through circumstance, to place some persons in the position of adhering to their
religious beliefs and forgoing certain benefits or conveniences, or accepting those benefits
or conveniences at the expense of violating their religious beliefs, is that "penalty on free
exercise" sufficient to violate the Constitution? We conclude that it is not, and that the
Sherbert line of cases actually demeaned and trivialized religion by permitting individuals
"an easy way out."
We hold today that as long as a governmental regulation is enacted for a neutral
secular purpose, and not for the invidious purpose of penalizing religious beliefs, the law
will be upheld, even though it may have the incidental effect of requiring some individuals to forfeit benefits if they are to comply with the law. As Justice Frankfurter wisely
bbserved, "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs."'" Adhering to one's religion is not always
easy or cost-free. In a pluralistic, religiously diverse country like the United States, neutral
laws will, inevitably, from time to time come into conflict with some religions. Society
cannot accommodate every variation in religious doctrine, however, permitting any citizen
to "opt out" of laws whenever observance of law renders observance of religion costly.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the landmark 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison,62 the great Chief Justice
John Marshall established the elemental constitutional principle that the Supreme Court
could declare acts of Congress repugnant to the Constitution void.63 It would subvert the
very foundations of all written constitutions, Mrshall held, if courts we'e not empowered
to enforce them against contrary acts of ordinary legislation. 6' We do not shrink from
the principles enunciated in Marbury, but wholeheartedly embrace them.
To acknowledge the constitutional role of this Court, however, is not to embrace
the well-intentioned but tragically misguided illusions of our dissenting colleagues. This
is 2023, a time for realism, not mysticism. As this Court acknowledged in Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins,65 there is no body of general or natural law binding on men existing like
some brooding omnipresence in the sky, and it is unconstitutional for this Court to behave
as if there is.' There is a difference in kind between the law as applied by philosophers
and treatise writers, the "law in the books," so to speak, and the real law, which can exist
only with the force of authority behind it. This Court is free only to apply such real law.
It was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who led the charge to emancipate this
Court from the natural law mysticism in which it had been mired in the 19th Century. In
the words of Justice Holmes:
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit,
cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeal, from the
State Courts, from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately, and criticize them as right or wrong according to the writer's notions
of a single theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that there is

61 Board of Educ. of Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940).
62 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
63 Id. at 177.
64 Id. at 178.

65 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
66 Id. at 68.
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one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any
court concerned. If there were such a transcendental body of law outside
of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed
by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their
independent judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of
law. The fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that
there is this outside thing to be found. Law is a word used with
different meanings, but law in the sense in which courts speak of it
today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.6"
We agree with Justice Holmes. Our role is to apply the law of the Constitution,
not to create it.68 As the legal philosopher John Austin so succinctly put it, "The
existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another.' 6 9
In one of his most famous and influential statements, John Marshall declared that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say'what the law
is.' 7 We agree. Our emphatic province and duty, however, is to modestly and
conscientiously say what the law is, not what we think it ought to be." Justice Iredell,
writing in the very decade in which the Bill of Rights was ratified, captured the essence
of the constitutional role of this Court:
If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those
constitutional provisions, it'is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that
as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the
Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case.
If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or of the Legislature
of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope
of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void,
merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of
natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed
standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject;
and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be,
that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed
an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the
abstract principles of natural justice.72
The petitioners are not powerless in this matter. This is a democracy. They may
write letters to their congressional representatives; they may speak and march and publish
their views, working to have the law repealed. They may go even farther, and try to get
the rights they wish to entrench in the Constitution placed there in the only way that rights
may ever legitimately be added to the Constitution, through amendment.
Some individuals may wish that the Constitution already contained sexual and
procreative rights. It does not. Their proper recourse is to seek a constitutional amendment
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U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68 See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Whence does
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69 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (1832).
70 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 137.
71 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
72 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring).
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explicitly placing those rights in the document. It is not for judges to read rights into the
Constitution that are not there, placing the burden on the people to amend the Constitution
to remove rights that never existed in the first place. To strike down an act of Congress
or a state legislature on the amorphous basis that it violates the "penumbras" of the Bill
of Rights, or the Ninth Amendment's vague invocation of unspecified rights "retained by
the people," or the grandiloquent oxymoron "ordered liberty," is simply to assert a right
to hold laws passed by legislatures void because they contradict laws promulgated by
God, or the natural order. Such invocation of natural law is in turn nothing more than an
invitation to the judge to substitute his or her policy judgment for that of the elected
representatives of the people.
The Constitution is not a creature of this Court. This Court is a creature of the
Constitution. Nothing in the Constitution creates a right to privacy. Nothing in the
Constitution creates a right to bear children. We uphold the Quality of Life Act of 2020
against all challenges. The decision of the Court of Appeals below striking down the Act
is
REVERSED.
JUSTICE DANIELS, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the result reached by the Chief Justice and the three other members
of this Court who join in his opinion. I am in full agreement with the analysis of
the Chief Justice with regard to the Free Exercise of Religion Clause claims asserted by
the petitioners Catherine and Ronald O'Meara. I do not agree, however, with many of the
extravagant statements made in the course of the Chief Justice's analysis of the right to
privacy claims asserted by the various petitioners. I respectfully believe that many of the
rather extreme statements made in the Chief Justice's opinion go well beyond what is
necessary to decide this case. I thus join in the judgment of the Court, but not its opinion.
The Chief Justice states categorically that natural law does not exist. Justice
Narducci, in his moving dissent, states with religious fervor that natural law does exist,
that it is knowable, and binding on this Court. Justice Rawlings, in his dissent, is as
scornful of the existence of natural law as the Chief Justice - indeed, there are passages
in Justice Rawlings' dissent that seem to call into question the very existence of all law.
Justice Rawlings, nevertheless, is also willing to cast his vote striking down the Quality
of Life Act, and Justices Bailey and Zevon have joined him. With four votes cast on each
side, I find myself in the middle of a legal and jurisprudential battle that invites a flighty
philosophical excursion into celestial questions concerning the existence of God, and the
source and legitimacy of law and moral obligation.
This is a journey I choose not to make. I find it unnecessary to enter this
metaphysical debate. I am a Supreme Court Justice, a governmental official working in
a governmental building with an address in Washington, D.C. I am a simple magistrate,
charged with the duty of deciding concrete cases and controversies. I am a lawyer. I am
not a theologian, charged with defending the existence of God; I am not a theoretical
physicist, charged with explaining the origins of the universe; I am not a moral
philosopher, charged with articulating the contours of ethical human behavior. I am a
mere Supreme Court Justice, a governmental official, a lawyer; I decide cases.
I approach that role as a realist and pragmatist. "The life of the law has not been
logic," Oliver Wendell Holmes instructed, "it has been experience. 7 3 Neither grand
theories nor the mechanistic application of the language in the constitutional text move
me to a clear-cut conclusion as to the constitutionality of the Quality of Life Act. I am
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moved, instead, by pragmatic judgments, common sense, modest deference to the
intelligence and good faith of the President and Congress who enacted the law, and
whatever wisdom and insights are borne of experience.
One of the elemental pieces of wisdom I have garnered from experience is to
is not the test of certainty. We
never say never. To quote again from Holmes, "Certitude
74
so.
not
were
that
things
many
of
cock-sure
been
have
The Chief Justice states that no rights exist under the Constitution except those
specifically enumerated in the text. I am not prepared to go so far. Many of the sweeping,
majestic phrases in the Constitution seem to positively invite elaboration: "life, liberty, or
property," "due process of law," "equal protection of the laws," "privileges and immunities
of citizenship," "free exercise" of religion - the list goes on. These are open-ended
phrases of aspiration, phrases that seem to vex and cajole each generation to fill them with
new meaning, constantly mediating the past and the future. That ongoing organic process
is what constitutional law is all about. The Constitution is never static; it is always
evolving, always becoming, always working itself more pure.75
Does natural law exist? Does the Ninth Amendment's statement about rights
"retained by the people" import natural law into the Constitution? If natural law does
exist, and is part of the Constitution, does it embrace a right of procreation? These
questions are intellectually fascinating, but irrelevant to the pragmatic, judicial mind. I am
perfectly willing to assume, without actually deciding, that a fundamental right to
procreation does exist in our Bill of Rights. Whether in the penumbras of specific rights,
or within the phrase "life, liberty, or property," or implicit in the Ninth Amendment does
not really matter. The Due Process Clause and the Ninth Amendment must mean
something, after all, and it hardly strains credulity to think that their meanings might be
sufficiently latitudinous to include76privacy rights over a choice as personal and intimate
as whether or not to have a child.
I am perfectly comfortable assuming the existence of a fundamental right of
procreation because, as a realist, I understand that such an assumption does not end the
inquiry; it only begins it. No rights exist in a vacuum. In complex social life all rights are
qualified, subject to reasonable restrictions for the greater good of the polity. In practical
terms, indeed, the notion of a "legal right" is meaningless unless annexed to a "legal
remedy." The term "right" is more an after-the-fact conclusion than a pre-existing
absolute; it is the label we affix to an enforceable judicial decree bringing to bear the

74 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918).
75 See Jaime Kalven, Editor's Introduction to HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION xvii

(Jaime Kalven ed., 1988).
76 Contrary to the Chief Justice's characterization of the case, I do not read Dixon v. Delaware, 525
U.S. 212 (2005), as a complete repudiation of the line of decisions emanating from Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). The principal issue in Dixon was whether this Court should, once and for all, flatly
overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The plurality opinion in Dixon completely repudiated Roe, and
in dicta made passing references to Griswold and the notion of substantive due process that might be
understood as undermining the continued vitality of Griswold and its progeny. See Dixon v. Delaware, 525
U.S. at 222 (plurality opinion). But the plurality in Dixon never uttered the words "Griswold v. Connecticut
is overruled." The plurality did utter the words "Roe v. Wade is overruled." Only the concurring opinion in
Dixon of Chief Justice Calvin - whose vote provided the five-justice majority necessary for the result expressly repudiated Griswold. Id. at 248 (Calvin, C.J., concurring). Because a reexamination of Griswold
was not necessary to render a decision in Dixon, I believe that Griswold arguably remains part of the law of
the land. Even if I am wrong in my understanding of Dixon, I will not acquiesce in the repudiation of the
notion that privacy is a fundamental constitutional right when a ruling on that issue is not necessary to
dispose of this case. I thus assume, without deciding, the continued vitality of Griswold.
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force of the sovereign state against a private party or public official who has invaded an
interest that the court has been moved to protect.77
A right to privacy exists if this Court says a right to privacy exists. Charles
Evans Hughes, who would himself become a Chief Justice of this Court, stated in a
speech in 1907, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say
it is."' Hughes did not intend that remark as an arrogant defense of the power of the
Court, but rather as a realistic reminder of the cautious approach the Court should take
to constitutional interpretation. As the wisdom goes, we are not final because we are
infallible, but infallible because we are final. Precisely because we are "the last word"
within the American legal system as to the meaning of the Constitution, we should be
extremely loath to ever ascribe to that document a meaning at odds with the interpretation
that has already been arrived at through the political process. This is not to say that we
should never strike down a law, but only that such an exercise should be an exceedingly
rare event. We do not own the Constitution. It belongs to the people of the United States.
We should be eternally vigilant against presuming that the people, through their elected
representatives, have acted in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution that we all
collectively cherish.
Whether this Court chooses to recognize the existence of a constitutional right
in a particular case will thus always depend on what that right is being balanced against
under the circumstances, and we owe great deference to the balance already struck
through the political process. In this case, the balance is close - agonizingly close.
In a carefree world government ought to leave the choice of the individual to
have or not to have children well enough alone. In everyday life we certainly think of
such a decision as quintessentially "private," and it does no great violence to legal theory
or the constitutional text to translate that common understanding into the status of a
"constitutional right."79 But this is not a carefree world. Rather, it is a world recently
shaken to the marrow by a war fought with tactical nuclear weapons, a world teetering
on the brink of an environmental crisis that could throw the natural ecology of the planet
so out of kilter as to make the earth uninhabitable, a world teeming with political and
economic confusion.
The President and Congress of the United States, through an open and democratic
deliberative process, weighed the competing policy interests and found that the exigencies
of the moment justify some curtailment of the privacy interest in procreation. The same
balance might not have been struck in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, because
an entirely different set of historical circumstances would have generated an entirely
different policy judgment. The same balance might not have been struck thirty years ago,
and might not be struck thirty years hence. But it was the balance struck by this Congress
and this President, in an open and vigorous public debate in which all sides were freely
80
able to press their arguments.
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As a Supreme Court Justice, my only task is to determine whether the decision
to curtail freedom of choice over procreation was within the realm of possible reasonable
policy options. Whether I would have voted for the bill is not important. For who am I,
an appointed member of a Court consisting of only nine people, to second-guess the
considered judgment of the other two branches of government? Unless the decision
reached through the crucible of public political debate is so utterly devoid of any plausible
supporting rationale as to be patently unreasonable, this Court has no mandate to strike
down the decision.
I find the nice legal tests traditionally bandied about to support rulings on such
momentous controversies somewhat disingenuous and misleading, and have purposefully
avoided their invocation in this opinion." My conclusions are not affected by whether
I cast my ruling in the glittery garb of "strict scrutiny," with its formula of "compelling
state interests" and "precisely tailored" means, or simply in the more common clothes of
"reasonableness." For whatever the words invoked after-the-fact to rationalize the
conclusion, my conclusion would be the same; both the claims of procreative autonomy
and religious free exercise asserted by the petitioners in these cases must, in a free and
democratic society, be subject to reasonable restrictions. Congress did not, it must be
remembered, cut off all procreative rights. This is not a no-children law, but a twochildren law. This is not a law passed on whimsy; it has no smell of "the fix." It was
passed, rather, in the midst of a very real and palpable crisis, a crisis that is still far from
having run its appointed course. I cannot in good conscience say it is unreasonable, and
I cannot in good conscience declare it unconstitutional.
JUSTICE NARDUCCI, dissenting.
There is a creeping darkness on the edge of town, a squalid depressing blackness
that threatens to envelope and smother that greatest of all embodiments of human dignity
and promise: the Constitution of the United States. In a decision that I pray will some day
be remembered as an evil abomination to rival Dred Scott v. Sandford, 2 a majority of
this Court refuses to recognize in our Constitution one of the most basic of all natural
human rights, the right to bear children.
The Court today upholds a law that would have been unthinkable to the framers,
unthinkable to the great Chief Justice /Marshall, and unthinkable to this Court itself as
recently as the turn of this century. Caught up in rigid and mechanical formalism, the
Chief Justice has written an opinion so devoid of courage and imagination as to disgrace
the memory of John Marshall and the legacy of the framers that he so superficially

consensus.") (quoting ROBERT DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITICS 10 (1968)).
81 See Neal Devins, The Collapse of Doctrinal Integrity in Modern Supreme Court Opinions, in XVII
INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW, CHARTING THE FUTURE COURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Neal

Devins ed., 2008).
82 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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invokes.83 The cryptic concurring opinion of my dear colleague Justice Daniels saddens
me all the more, for she should know better.84
I.
The opinion of the Chief Justice turns the Constitution upside down. It speaks
as if the civil liberties of men and women are somehow created by the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. The opposite is true. Civil liberties - basic human rights - preexist
the Constitution. The basic liberties of man are fundamental aspects of humanity with
which all persons are born; they do not come from governments or constitutions; they are
not dependent upon the grace of the state. In the words written by Thomas Jefferson in
our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that man is
endowed by his Creator with certain inalienable rights. . .. "" Governments are
instituted among men not to create these rights but to secure them.
The opinion of the Chief Justice speaks as if somehow any right that did not
make its way explicitly into the Constitution was somehow expunged and forgotten. The
Chief Justice's opinion, like this Court's unfortunate holding in Dixon v. Delaware,86
unceremoniously discards doctrines that have time out of mind flourished at the core of
our constitutional jurisprudence.87
Let me begin with the oldest decision of this Court cited by the Chief Justice,
Calder v. Bull.8 The Chief Justice disingenuously quotes only from the concurring
opinion of Justice Iredell, ignoring the lead opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice
Chase. In the opinion of Justice Chase, it was made abundantly clear that the Constitution
was meant to incorporatepre-existing natural law principles, not to expunge them. Thus
Justice Chase explained:
There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments,
which will determine and over-rule [sic] an apparent and flagrant abuse
of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law;
or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for
the protection whereof the government was established. An act of the
Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first
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In reading Chief Justice Calvin's opinion, I am reminded of lines from the poet W. H. Auden:

Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose,
Speaking clearly and most severely,
Law is as I've told you before,
Law is as you know I suppose,
Law is but let me explain it once more,
Law is The Law.
WYNSTAN HUGH AUDEN, Law Like Love, in SELECTED POETRY OF W. H. AUDEN 62, 63 (1958).
84 Because I consider the invasion of the petitioners' constitutional right of privacy so obvious, I
will
not write separately on the Free Exercise of Religion Clause issue, except to say that I, like my other
dissenting colleagues, would find that the O'Mearas' First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion
have indeed been violated. I join in that part of my brother Rawlings' dissenting opinion.
85 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis
added).
86 525 U.S. 212 (2005).
87 See DAN BRAVEMAN, WILLIAM C. BANKS, AND RODNEY A. SMOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM at v-xii (10th ed. 2018).

88 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
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principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful
exercise of legislative authority.89
Similarly, Chief Justice John Marshall, whom the current Chief Justice is more
fond of quoting than emulating, understood the role of a Supreme Court Justice as far
more ambitious than that of a mere clerical scrivener parsing the literal language of the
constitutional text. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck9° is illustrative.
The Supreme Court was faced with an attempt by the State of Georgia to repudiate certain
land contracts. Marshall observed:
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is
not to be disguised that the framers of the Constitution viewed, with
some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the
feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in
adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield
themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions.9
This Quality of Life Act, passed over 200 years after those words were written
reflects a similar tide of "sudden and strong passions" borne out of the
Marshall,
by John
"feelings of the moment." Can anyone really doubt what John Marshall would do if
confronted with this legislation? Would he follow the brittle jurisprudence of Chief Justice
Calvin and accede to this statute merely because he could locate no specific language in
the Bill of Rights rendering the statute void? Surely John Marshall and his colleagues on
the Court would have found a limitation on the number of children an American couple
may bear an utter abomination, repugnant to the first principles of law and government
upon which the nation was founded.
And let there be no doubt that Chief Justice Marshall was willing to rest on first
principles in enunciating the decisions of the Court. Returning to Fletcher v. Peck, for
example, Marshall in his opinion stated, "It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court,
that . . . the state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles, which are
common to ourfree institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the
United States, from passing [this] law .... "92
II.
Throughout our history, this Court has risen to the challenge put to it by Chief
Justice Marshall, rising up to strike down legislation repugnant to the general principles
of liberty and due process embedded in the Bill of Rights, notwithstanding the lack of any
direct textual statement in the Constitution describing the fundamental rights at issue.

89 Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.).
90

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

Id. at 137-38.
92 Id. at 139 (emphasis added). Justice Johnson wrote a concurring opinion in Fletcher in which he
91

based his holding "on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose
laws even on the Deity." Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). I must say that Justice
Johnson's rhetorical flourish is a bit much even for me; it stretches the notion of natural law somewhat far to
assert that the "bona-fide purchaser for value rule" is binding even on God.
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Decisions of this Court have held that there is a fundamental right to vote, but
no such fundamental right is contained in the text of the Constitution. 93 This Court has
recognized a fundamental right to travel, but the word "travel" does not appear anywhere
in the constitutional text.94 This Court has recognized a fundamental right of freedom of
association, though no such right is mentioned in the Constitution.95
This Court has been particularly generous in its willingness to hold that questions
concerning child-bearing and child-rearing fall presumptively within the sovereignty of
the family, and not the sovereignty of the state.96 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,97 for
example, we struck down a law that forced parents to send their children to public
schools. Nothing in the constitutional text speaks of schools, or the education of children.
But this Court in Pierce properly observed that "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only."9'
Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,99 this Court struck down a law that prohibited
grade schools from teaching subjects in any language other than English - again, despite
the lack of any discussion in our Constitution of education or official languages. In Meyer
we expounded on the meaning of the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."
If this Court is to take the language of Meyer seriously, as it should, then
certainly decisions concerning the number of children to bear must be understood as
embraced by the phrases "to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."'' Indeed, on numerous occasions this Court has stated precisely that. In
Skinner v. Oklahoma,'12 this Court struck down a sterilization law for habitual criminals,
speaking of "a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race - the right to have
offspring."'0 3 In Skinner we referred to "marriage and procreation" as "fundamental,"

93 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533

(1964).
94

See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Shapiro v.Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

95 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449

(1958).
96

See generally KAY P.

KINDRED, EDUCATION LAW:

THEORY AND PRACTICE §

1.09 (1999).

97 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
98

Id. at 535.

99 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

100 Id. at 399. For an excellent overview of this strain of constitutional law throughout history, see
JOHN NOWAK AND RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10th ed. 2015).
1Ol Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
102 316 U.S. 535, (1942).
103

Id. at 536.
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and as among "the basic civil rights of man."' ' And in Griswold v. Connecticut,10 5
Justice Douglas powerfully captured the essence of the right of procreation:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions. 06
III.
The Chief Justice could use a bit of a history lesson, for he has fallen prey to
exactly the concern that caused trepidation among the framers, a concern that they later
specifically addressed in the Ninth Amendment.
The absence of a bill of rights was one of the major arguments advanced by the
Anti-Federalists in their opposition to ratification of the Constitution." °7 The argument
that the Constitution was flawed without a bill of rights posed difficult questions of
substance and strategy for the Federalists. Some friends of the Constitution, like Thomas
Jefferson, essentially agreed with the Anti-Federalist argument, believing as a matter of
principle that the Constitution should have a declaration of basic rights. In outlining his
critique of the Constitution, for example, Jefferson wrote to James Madison that he
regretted:
First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the
aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of press, protection
against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and
unremitting force of the Thabeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all
matters of the fact triable by the laws of the land and not by the law of
Nations.... Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are
entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and
what no just government should refuse, or rest on influence.'0 8
Other proponents of the Constitution, however, felt that the inclusion of a bill of
rights would not enhance the protection of liberty, and might even pose dangerous threats

104 Id. at 541. As Justice Walter Dellinger eloquently expressed the point in
Dixon v. Delaware, 525
U.S. 212, 263 (2005) (Dellinger, J., dissenting), "The time has come for this Court to once again embrace
the fundamental notion upon which our nation was founded: that men and women are not the creatures and
servants of the state, but that the state is the creature and servant of men and women." Id.
105 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106 Id. at 486. As Justice Goldberg stated in Griswold: "Surely the
Government, absent a showing of
a compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree that all husbands and wives must be sterilized
after two children have been born to them." Id. at 496-97 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

107 See HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR

64-65 (1981). (This alleged

deficiency in the Constitution was sincerely pressed by many, but was also a merely convenient and
somewhat less sincerely advanced argument by others, who were determined to oppose ratification on any
grounds that might prove effective.) Id.
108 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in XII THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 140 (Julian Boyd ed., 1955).
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to the protection of essential rights. In the early stages of the ratification debates, for
example, James Madison raised basic objections to a bill of rights, maintaining that the
Constitution did not grant the federal government affirmative power to invade basic rights,
and so no bill of rights was necessary to proscribe what the federal government could not
do in any event. Madison was worried that a bill of rights might hinder rather than
enhance protection of liberties because their enumeration would tend to imply the
exclusion of other rights not listed and because there was reason "to fear that a positive
declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite
latitude."

Madison believed that the federal structure of the Constitution, particularly

the jealousy of the states of the national government, would afford greater security against
encroachment on basic rights. He argued that:
[E]xperience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions
when its controul is most needed. Repeated violations of these
parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in
every State ....

Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there

is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in
the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the
sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.'
The Federalists, of course, managed to win ratification, but only with the
understanding that a list of amendments declaring basic rights would quickly be added.
Madison's views changed."' Madison became the primary architect of the Bill of
Rights.
Among Madison's proposals was the Ninth Amendment: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.""' 2 Madison's language could not be clearer. Nor could his intent. As
Madison stated to the House of Representatives:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow
by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were
intended to be assigned into the hand of the General Government, and
were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments
I have ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights into this
system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted

109

5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269, 271 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).

110 Id. at 272 (emphasis in original).
In 1789 Madison wrote to a campaign worker, George Eve:

[Ilt is my sincere opinion that the Constitution ought to be
revised, and that the first Congress meeting under it ought to
prepare and recommend to the States for ratification, the most

satisfactory provisions for all essential rights, particularly the
rights of Conscience in the fullest latitude, the freedom of the
press, trials by jury, security against general warrants...

Id. at 320, n. I.
112

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth
resolution.'3
That "last clause of the fourth resolution" to which Madison referred would become the
present Ninth Amendment.
My colleague Justice Rawlings says that the Ninth Amendment is but a'"rule of
construction" and not an "independent font of substantive legal rights." I must confess that
I do not grasp his distinction. If the Ninth Amendment is but a rule of construction, it is
nonetheless a profound rule, a rule that instructs that we are not to approach the
Constitution as if it were an internal revenue code, but rather as a broad bulwark of liberty
designed to preserve the fundamental natural rights of man.
IV.
The twilight of my own long career on this Court is now consumed in a
deepening gray darkness, as I sense not only the winter of my own life, but of the human
dignity and autonomy that I had thought the Constitution would preserve, even against the
inexorable onslaughts of modernity. I will not surrender without a fight. I will instead
admonish the words of the poet Dylan Thomas:
Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
4
Rage, rage against the dying of the light."
I know of no right more fundamental than the freedom to bear children. It is a
right as old as Adam and Eve, a right self-evident in the very construction of man and
woman. If government is not required to refrain from regulating a matter so personal and
intimate as this, then government may do anything, and men and women are but robots.
The invasion of privacy created by this statute is more than an unseemly insinuation into
the bedroom; it is an insidious and brutal exercise of power that works inexorably to strip
human beings of that which makes life worth living: love - love between man and
woman, parent and child, humankind and Creator.
I will not go gentle into this good night. For as long as I am on this Court, I will
rage against the dying of the light. I dissent.
JUSTICE RAWLINGS, with whom JUSTICE BAILEY and JUSTICE ZEVON
join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I should say at the outset that I fully agree with Justice Daniels in her
jurisprudential approach to this case. I, too, find the excesses in the Chief Justice's
opinion disturbing. I, too, find the mystical netherworld of my dear brother Narducci
incomprehensible, and well beyond the scope of my duties as a judge in a secular state
charged with administration of the law of man, not the law of God. Applying instead the
very earthy and mundane law of the United States, I would hold that the Quality of Life
Act violates the Constitution.

439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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1 ANNALS OF CONG.
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See DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night, in COLLECTED POEMS 128, 128

(1957).
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As a matter of legal doctrine, I find this case is quite simple. Procreation is a
fundamental constitutional right, anchored in the "liberty" explicitly protected under the
Due Process Clause." 5 Government may thus limit the number of children an individual
may have only to serve compelling interests, and only by means narrowly tailored to serve
those interests. The free exercise of religion is also a fundamental constitutional right. The
Free Exercise Clause protects more than direct regulation of religious belief; it also
prevents indirect and incidental penalties on the free exercise of religion whenever the
government cannot demonstrate a compelling justification for not carving out an exception
to its regulatory scheme accommodating free exercise interests. The Quality of Life Act
comes up short under both the Due Process and the Free Exercise Clauses, and I would
strike it down.
The Chief Justice writes as if the words "procreation" or "privacy" would literally
have to appear in the Constitution to be recognized as constitutional rights. Justice
Narducci writes as if the Ninth Amendment incorporates the indeterminate universe of
"natural law" into the Constitution, authorizing the Supreme Court to serve as an ongoing
constitutional convention, somehow absorbing the currents of universal being and
translating them into constitutional law. As Justice Daniels ably demonstrates, they are
both wrong.
I add to Justice Daniels' opinion only the two following observations. If the
Chief Justice must find a word in the constitutional text to support every asserted right,
then surely the word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause will do for this case. The word
is in the Constitution; it must have been intended to mean something. Contrary to the
Chief Justice, who snidely labels Justice Harlan's famous phrase "ordered liberty" a
"grandiloquent oxymoron," I find the phrase to capture the essence of constitutional
democracy: the never ending tension between freedom and order. The word "liberty" is
not an open-ended mandate to subsequent generations of Supreme Court Justices to read
whatever they wish into the Constitution. It is rather a constitutional command to enforce
against government encroachments upon affairs of life that, by tradition and consensus,
have been universally understood as off-limits to the state in a free society. When, by long
and unwavering custom and practice, certain principles of justice become so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of society as to take on a virtually instinctual status as
"fundamental," this Court acts well within its proper institutional role in declaring those
principles part of the Constitution. The right to be left alone on matters of procreation
falls within that zone of deeply rooted tradition, and should be recognized by this Court
as part of the ordered liberty protected by Due Process Clause.
I sincerely believe that this would be our undisputed law today, and that a
substantial segment of this Court would never have hinted to the contrary in Dixon v.
Delaware," 6 had not certain zealots in the history of this Court abused the notion of
invasion of privacy by attempting to create privacy rights that had not been long
recognized in the traditions of the culture. Government must avoid dictating how many
children one may have, but government is not required to abstain from all regulation of
sex and marriage. The right to privacy does not encompass the right to commit adultery,
fornication, or homosexual intercourse. For that would be to push the asserted right well
beyond the customs of the culture. This Court is not to be in the lead, forcing constitu-

115 1 believe Justice Daniels accurately characterizes the true holding of Dixon v. Delaware, 525 U.S.
212 (2005), in her assertion that the plurality opinion, while coming quite close in dicta to an outright
repudiation of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), never actually did so. I thus feel no
compunction about my continued adherence to the theories espoused by Justice Harlan in Griswold. See
generally Michael Gerhardt, Stare Decisis: Opus 5, 99 CAL. L. REv. 88 (2009).
116 525 U.S. 212 (2005).
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tional rights from on high down upon the body politic. Rather, this Court's function is
more that of a nagging conscience of the people, reminding them of principles that they
already by long practice have recognized, but perhaps discarded in the heat of the political
moment.
The unfortunate ruling of the Court today is also the product, I believe, of resort
by some members of this Court over the years to exotic and untenable theories of
constitutional law. My brother Narducci is guilty of this. He mistakes passion for analysis.
To ground constitutional rights in "penumbras" and the Ninth Amendment is to invite
ridicule and parody. These truly are nothing but natural law theory dressed up in
constitutional garb. On this point, I agree with the Chief Justice. Natural law does not
exist. Humans invented natural law for the same reason that they invented God: a quaking
fear of the dark existential loneliness of the universe. 17
Justice Narducci's reliance on the Ninth Amendment is particularly foolhardy.
The Amendment was never intended as an independent font of substantive rights, but as
a mere rule of construction, making clear that the Bill of Rights should not by implication
be read to increase the powers of national government in any areas not enumerated.
I, therefore, come out very much where Justice Daniels comes out: a pragmatist
treating procreation as a fundamental right because the people have by custom long so
treated it. It is all practical judgment, common sense. I part ways with Justice Daniels,
however, in my application of that common sense. She sees the current crisis facing the
United States as a justification for holding that the infringement upon fundamental rights
caused by the Quality of Life Act is outweighed by the national benefits that the Act will
achieve. She defers to the balance struck by the political process because she trusts the
benign good faith of that process. She is optimistic about government. Government is your
friend. This act of legislation, as its very name promises, will improve our quality of life.
I approach the balance of interests, however, from precisely the opposite
presumption. When fundamental rights are implicated, I am a pessimist about the political
process. Government is not your friend.' I would have thought that, in practical terms,
this is at bottom what the label "fundamental right" means to the jurist: assume the worst.
When a fundamental right is involved, the judge should rigorously cross-examine the
political branches, putting them to this test: are there not some other methods that you
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1 no more believe in natural law than I believe in religion. As Karl Marx correctly observed,

"Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless
conditions. It is the opium of the people." KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT"
131 (Joseph O'Malley ed. & trans. & Annette John trans. 1970) (emphasis added).
118 Because my colieagues on the Court find it quite the fashion these days to cite history and
philosophy, I offer the insights of James Madison on this point:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the
place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to controul the abuses of government. But
what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controuls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
controul itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary controul on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 354-55 (James Madison) (Tudor Pub. Co., 1937).
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could have employed that would have accomplished your goals, methods that would not
have impacted so severely on these rights? Perhaps those methods would be somewhat
less effective, somewhat less efficient, but the price of more cumbersome effectuation of
public policy goals is well worth it if pressures on long-established civil liberties are
relieved. For the reasons carefully delineated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals
below, I am not convinced that the government has sustained this burden." 9 I would
uphold the petitioners' right to privacy claims.
I would also uphold the Free Exercise Clause claims of Ronald and Catherine
O'Meara. My own agnosticism and antipathy for religion do not prevent me from
conscientiously applying the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise. The Chief
Justice's opinion would render that guarantee a virtual nullity, for it would apply the
Amendment only to the rare act of government actually presuming to legislate religious
beliefs. Surely the Amendment must go farther than that, also interdicting governmental
actions that have an incidental "spillover" effect on religion, when government cannot
justify that negative effect with a compelling interest and a demonstration that the
government has used the narrowest possible mechanism for achieving those interests. I
think that the Court makes a tragic error in overruling Sherbert v. Verner."2 °
Under this Court's stultifying literalism, there is, in the words of the Chief
Justice, "a right to bear arms, but no right to bear children." The offensive crassness of
this observation supplies its own refutation.
JUSTICE ZEVON, with whom JUSTICE BAILEY joins, dissenting.
I join in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rawlings, and concur in all of his legal
analysis. I write separately to state that I do not wish to be understood as accepting the
gratuitous personal observations contained in Justice Rawlings' opinion, such as his
remarks about God and religion.

119 See Webster v. Heiden, 88 F.3d 1008, 1012-16 (15th Cir. 2001).
120 374 U.S. 398 (1963). At this point my Due Process Clause and Religion Clause arguments merge,
for I do not find the heavy-handed measures of the Quality of Life Act narrowly tailored enough to meet the
demands of a Constitution that embraces elemental notions of fundamental liberty. Again, I am content to
rely on the thoughtful analysis of the Court of Appeals below.

